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music
Yc. angin
early 30 years ago, Bob Dylan recorded the clas-
sic song The Times They Are A Changin'7i
Back then, Dylan probably had no idea that
technology would someday exist to distribute his songs
throughout the world in near-perfect digital reproductions.
Today, through the advent of the Internet and digital net-
works, consumers have increasing access to digital down-
loads and digital broadcasts of copyrighted musi*c.2
Downloaded music on the Internet alone is estimated to
become a $4 billion business by 2002.:,
By Mark Plotkin
Internet'? MP3? Digital? How technology has forced the law to
The United States has attempted
to keep pace with emerging digital
music distribution technology
through its copyright law.
4
However, the perfect quality, limit-
less geographical scope, and expo-
nential growth of digital music deliv-
ery implicate the varied and conflict-
ing interests of songwriters, perform-
ers, record companies, broadcasters,
and the public. 5  Reconciling the
interests of these groups in digital
music delivery has not been, and will
not be, easy.
6
In November 1995, Congress first
addressed the copyright problems
posed by digital music delivery in the
Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 ("the 1995
Act").7 The 1995 Act breaks with
traditional copyright law by creating
a digital public performance right in
the copyright owners of sound
recordings. 8 The 1995 Act provides
that when a song is broadcast by a
digital subscription service, the
owner of the sound recording-usual-
ly the record company-is entitled to
royalties. 9  However, traditional
copyright law still recognizes that if
the same song is broadcast in an ana-
log format (such as AM or FM radio),
the owner of the sound recording
receives no royalties.
10
The newly enacted Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(the "DMCA") is a further departure
from traditional copyright law.
1 1
Among other provisions, the DMCA
expands the 1995 Act by allowing the
owners of sound recording copyrights
a right to royalties in "Internet
Radio" or "streaming" broadcasts.
12
The Act also clarifies that sound
recording copyright owners are enti-
The DMCA's allowance of sound
recording royalties in streaming
Internet broadcasts is particularly
problematic.14  Most streaming
Internet broadcasts are non-interac-
tive and non-subscription broadcasts
of music, as in traditional radio
where, no sound recording royalties
exist. 1 5 Additionally, in streaming
broadcasts the end user does not
retain a tangible copy of the song
that can be recopied. By allowing
song copyright royalties in streaming
Internet broadcasts, the DMCA
treats these broadcasts as radically
different from traditional analog
broadcasts. 16
Because digital delivery promises
to become an increasingly popular
means of music distribution, the cur-
rent law presents multiple problems
for the interested parties.1 7 First,
this new legislation stands to hurt
songwriters because their exclusive
performance rights have been com-
promised in this new digital arena.
18
Additionally, it may delay the growth
of "streaming" broadcast technology
as many future "streaming" broad-
casters are not entitled to govern-
ment-set royalty rate protections.
19
The public also stands to lose by
being denied access to the full poten-
tial of streaming technology by yield-
ing cost control of downloaded songs
to the large record companies.
20
A likely outcome of the onerous
provisions of the 1995 Act and the
DMCA will be the emergence of new
smaller "Internet-only" record com-
panies.2 1 These companies will have
an alternative business structure,
which will not require them to rely
on the DMCA and the 1995 Act pro-
visions. 2 2 Such companies will com-
deal with a new era in music distribution
tled to royalties whenever a tangible
copy of the song is downloaded.
13
pletely circumvent the large record
companies by directly signing exclu-
sive contracts with songwriters and
recording artists. They will also
directly distribute, broadcast and sell
their music via the Internet in wide-
spread low-cost distributions.
23
A Crash Course in
Music Copyrights
To understand how the 1995 Act
and the DMCA change music licens-
ing, one should be aware that, in gen-
eral, two distinct copyrights exist for
each song that is recorded: the song
copyright and the sound recording
copyright. 24 First, the song copy-
right secures the actual song itself
while the sound recording copyright
protects the particular recording of
the song.2 5 Therefore, every time
someone covers one of Bob Dylan's
songs, Dylan, through his music pub-
lisher, receives a royalty payment
because the song copyright protects
him.26 The artist and producer who
cover the Dylan song are only creat-
ing a sound recording of a song, and
therefore only have a copyright on
their particular version of the song,
and not on the underlying song
itself.2 7 The practices of the music
industry dictate that when a record
company commissions the recording
of a song by either its author or a sec-
ondary artist, the sound recording
copyright is conveyed to the record
company.2 8
The difference between a song and
a sound recording copyright is partic-
ularly important during a public per-
formance of the song.2 9 A public per-
formance results from a live stage
show or a media broadcast of the
work.3 0 Traditionally, songwriters,
as owners of song copyrights, have
an exclusive right to royalties from
public performances of their songs,
even if someone else's sound record-
ing is performed. 3 1 As customary
owner of the sound recording copy-
right, the record companies typically
do not receive royalties from public
performances or broadcasts. 32 The
1995 Act and the DMCA dramatical-
ly depart from industry practice by
creating a new performance right for
the record companies when a song is
publicly "performed" in a digital
broadcast. 33
What is Digital Broadcasting
and How It Works
Today, there are two basic meth-
ods of digital music broadcasting: 1)
via a private digital network, which
is covered primarily by the 1995 Act
and, 2) via the Internet, which is
addressed by the DMCA. In both
instances, the basic technology of
digital broadcasting is similar to that
of a compact disc. Each stores music
by translating the sound into a bina-
ry series of Os and is. This process
allows the sound to be reproduced
and copied with no loss of fidelity.
34
In the case of digital broadcasting,
however, the binary series of Os and
ls are transmitted to multiple par-
ties rather than to just the single lis-
tener of the CD.
Broadcasting CD-quality music
over a private digital network today
is a reality. In the United States,
satellite services such as USSB or
Primestar and many cable systems
already provide access to channels
that broadcast specific styles of
music. Generally all of these chan-
nels are operated by only three com-
panies: Digital Cable Radio
Associates, Digital Music Express,
and Muzak. These channels operate
like traditional radio stations, play-
ing unannounced songs rather than
entire albums. Arguably, they do not
directly compete against CD sales
because the consumer cannot antici-
pate what song will be broadcast at
any given time; that is, the channels
are "non-interactive." These stations
are subscription services, and
requires a fee for access, an arrange-
ment fundamentally different from
AM/FM broadcast radio.
W ithin the past two years,
Internet digital music delivery has
exploded. 35  This extraordinary
growth can largely be attributed to
improved software and faster net-
working technology. Right now,
Internet music delivery can be divid-
ed into three distinct methods: 1) file
downloading, 2) webpage support,
and 3) streaming audio broadcasts.
Users of the Internet have been
able to download music and sounds
since the development of UNIX-
based FTP sites, which were prede-
cessors to the Web. FTP sites, how-
ever, were not popular with the gen-
eral public because they were much
more difficult to use than the Web.
In these "early days" of music distri-
bution via FTP, a download of a sin-
gle song could take over an hour due
to lack of adequate data compression.
Additionally, the end user had to
purchase an expensive hard drive
with enough storage for the songs.
So, although it was possible to down-
load digital music from the Internet,
it was highly impracticable and in no
way threatened traditional music
distribution.
In 1997, a new file compression
standard for digital music, MP3
(Mpegl Layer 3), was developed and
has become wildly popular for down-
loading music on the Internet.3 6 The
MP3 compression format makes
Internet distribution of music viable
for two reasons. MP3 allows a song
to occupy less space on the end user's
hard drive. More importantly, how-
ever, a song in the MP3 format can
be downloaded in a few minutes and
replayed on demand by the end user,
much like a CD. With the develop-
ment of inexpensive recordable CD's
(CD-R's), many computer users
already have the capacity to down-
load MP3-compressed songs from the
Internet and record perfect quality
mix" CD's.
The development of MP3 technolo-
gy has created new problems in com-
bating bootleg and unauthorized
recording distribution. In 1997,
Pearl Jam's newest album was ille-
gally distributed on the Internet in
the high quality MP3 format even
before its official release. 3 7 Because
of MP3's high quality, strong com-
pression, and wide availability, this
audio format promises to long defy
those attempting to end such illegal
distribution of music.
3 8
By the end of 1998, the record
companies took legal action against
the MP3 threat because Diamond
Multimedia had scheduled a release
of a "walkman-like" MP3 player
called the RIO PMP 300 ("RIO").
39
The RIO directly threatens the
record companies because it allows
playback of MP3 recordings without
the use of a home computer. With
the RIO, consumers can download an
hour of selected digital songs from
the Internet using a computer, then
unhook the RIO from their computer
and take the music with them. The
Recording Industry of America
("RIAA"), the association that repre-
sents the record companies' collective
interests, quickly responded to the
threat that RIO poses to record sales.
The group won a temporary restrain-
ing order against the RIO's release in
the US. 40 At the time of this writing,
the manufactures of RIO filed a suc-
cessful response to the RIAA com-
plaint, and the RIO is now sold
online and at a few of the larger
national electronic stores.4 1
Despite the RIO controversy,
there remains a strong demand for
software that will play MP3 files
directly on the computer. 42  This
demand is best illustrated by the 10
million downloads of Winamp, a pop-
ular Windows MP3 Player 4 3 . The
very efforts to regulate MP3 down-
loads have likely made it more
appealing since it now has an "out-
law" allure. 4 4 According to Time,
fast T-1 Internet connections on
many college campuses have turned
three-fourths of the students into
MP3 music pirates.4 5 In February,
Lycos became the first search engine
to offer searches of both legal and
illegal MP3s by artists and song title.
Outside the dominant record compa-
nies, it appears the rest of the music
industry, though somewhat appre-
hensive, is intrigued by the promise
of MP3 album distribution.
According to some, MP3 promises to
"even out" artists' access to the pub-
lic and make it easier for musicians
to become their "own" record company.
4 6
Digital audio has also been
increasingly incorporated in actual
websites to make Web "surfing" a
truly multimedia experience. The
current versions of both Netscape
and Internet Explorer allow users to
browse sites with music embedded
into the actual scripting of the web-
page. Internet users also have
actively expanded their ability to lis-
ten to or script webpages with music
by downloading specialized "plug-
ins," such as Macromedia's
Shockwave.
4 7
The most important development
for digital broadcasting on the
Internet is the realization of stream-
ing audio files. "Streaming" technol-
ogy permits the user to receive
music-and now video-in real time
via the Internet without having to
download and store entire files. This
process is known as "buffering."
Progressive Network's RealAudio
pioneered Internet audio buffering
technology in 1995. At this early
stage, it could only achieve a poor
AM-like quality broadcast due to net
congestion and compression chal-
lenges. Today, however, with the lat-
est G2 release of the RealAudio play-
er, near-FM quality stereo broad-
casts with supporting video are pos-
sible.48  The future of streaming
audio already has converged with
the MP3 compression format. This
February, beta releases of streaming
MP3 players were available on the
Internet for product testing.
4 9
The number of Internet streaming
broadcasts and the number of people
who tune into them has grown
remarkably. In February, RealAudio
announced that downloads of the
RealAudio player have topped 50
million, though most of these copies
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broadcast. comhave also gained
popularity. Streaming audio on the
Internet still has much untapped
commercial potential. Through web-
sites such as SHOUTcast, any
Internet user who has RealAudio
capabilities can now set up a stream-
ing audio broadcast and form an
Internet radio station with no other
special equipment.5 1 The latest sign
of the maturation of streaming
Internet broadcasts came recently
from, of all places, Victoria's Secret.
This lingerie boutique used a multi-
million dollar Super Bowl television
ad to promote an Internet streaming
video broadcast of its fashion show.
According to the company, more than
1.5 million Web users watched the
broadcast live. 52 As streaming audio
technology continues to improve, and
as users continue to recognize its
potential, the Internet will likely
form the backbone of a global digital
radio, and possibly television, network.
The Positions and Plottings of
the Interested Parties
Since digital broadcasting has
become so promising, record compa-
nies, songwriters, digital broadcasters,
and the public have a significant stake
in establishing how it is regulated.
The recording industry is cur-
rently dominated by a handful of
major record companies, which have
an interest in maintaining a virtual
monopoly on music distribution.
These companies are especially
apprehensive about the growth of
digital music delivery because it
threatens to challenge their strong
market position.
All record companies, however,
are concerned about protecting their
traditional sales of music recordings.
Record companies invest heavily in
publicity to generate profitable
record sales. If the same recording is
available on the Internet or on an
interactive digital network, in per-
fect reproduction, the record compa-
ny loses a potential sale with every
illegal download or copy. Even copies
of the downloaded song can be per-
fectly reproduced again and again, so
digital distribution of music threat-
ens exponential losses to record com-
panies. The new laws, however,
serve to mitigate some of these losses
by creating new performance rights.
Record companies and their trade
association, RIAA, have been active
in prosecuting all forms of music
piracy. Recently, RIAA has applied
pressure to illegal digital broadcast-
ers who do not pay royalties to record
companies as provided by current
law. RIAA has already sent strongly
worded letters to such broadcasters
asserting the record companies'
rights. Its members have even forced
some illegal music sites to complete-
ly shut down.
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Since songwriters have long
enjoyed a traditional public perform-
ance right, they and their collection
societies are concerned with perpetu-
ating this asset in digital broadcast
format. Every time a song is per-
formed in public-whether in an
arena, airplane, or media broad-
-
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cast-songwriters are entitled to roy-
alties. Songwriters currently collect
their performance royalties inde-
pendently of record companies.
Major songwriter collection societies
such as ASCAP, BMI and SESAC
license all of the songs in their
respective catalogues. These groups
collect the performance royalties and
distribute them to the individual
songwriters based on the amount
their song was performed. The pro-
tection of their performance right is
therefore critical to ensure fair com-
pensation when one of their songs
becomes a hit.
Until this year, songwriters have
also enjoyed performance royalties in
restaurants and bars. Under the
recent enactment of the Fairness in
Music Licensing Act, however, song-
writers lose much of this royalty
base. 54 As songwriters see their roy-
alties shrink from performances in
bars and restaurants, they have a
fundamental interest in expanding,
or in at least preserving, traditional
music copyright law in digital broad-
casting to ensure continued royalties.
Digital music broadcasters hope
to replace traditional analog broad-
casts. 55 Despite the 50 million total
downloads of RealAudio, only a small
percentage of the public currently
has access to digital music broad-
casts. Most people do not subscribe to
a satellite or cable service with digi-
tal music stations, nor own a com-
puter with an adequate Internet con-
nection for practical digital music
delivery. Even regular Internet
users still rely on local analog broad-
cast radio stations for most of their
music. To establish digital broad-
casting as the future industry stan-
dard, digital broadcasters must
invest in online technology to
enhance its quality and to generate
public demand. Establishing digital
music distribution as a replacement
to traditional music delivery requires
a significant amount of money. It is
no surprise, then, digital broadcast-
ers are reluctant to pay out royalties.
When the end user downloads music
to produce a "tangible copy" of the
song, digital broadcasters all concede
that record companies have a legiti-
mate copyright interest. They
strongly disagree, however, what
royalty percentage should be
imposed.5 6 When the consumer does
not end up with a "tangible copy" of
the song, digital broadcasters are
even more opposed to royalty expens-
es. With the enactment of the DMCA
and the creation of new record com-
pany royalties in "streaming" broad-
casts, it is unclear what the future
negotiated royalty rates will be. If
the rates are too high, the DMCA
could severely restrict future growth
of Internet broadcasting; consumers
may not be willing to pay the high
prices needed to cover broadcasters'
royalty and operating expenses.
Recently, a consortium of the
three largest Internet broadcasters
formed The Digital Media
Association ("DiMA"). 5 7 According to
Hillary Rosen, president and CEO of
RIAA, the sole purpose of DiMA was
to undermine the record companies.
The DiMA, however, only represents
the three largest Internet broadcast-
ers and not the digital broadcast
industry in general. 58 Accordingly,
both the DiMA and RIAA share a
common interest in suppressing com-
petition in Internet music distribu-
tion.59 In fact, the DiMA and RIAA
pooled their special interest pres-
sure, as evidenced by the successful
lobby for "grandfather" royalty rate
provisions in the DMCA, narrowly
tailored and uniquely favorable to
DiMA members.
The public at large has a stake in
regulation that encourages digital
broadcasting growth. Digitally
broadcast music enhances the Web,
making cyberspace a more friendly
and entertaining environment.
Today, computers offer not just pic-
tures and text but are fast becoming
multimedia machines. In fact, many
new home computer systems produce
sound that rivals even the top hi-fi
stereo. Consumers have an interest
in promoting digital broadcasting
because it furthers the versatility
and usefulness of home computers.
Digital broadcasting also promises
consumers more choice in music
selection. Consumers can escape the
technological and geographic bound-
aries of analog stations and instead
listen to radio stations from all over
the world. Finally, "on demand"
music downloading is more conven-
ient than buying CD's. Consumers,
in most cases, must buy an entire CD
to get the one song that they like. By
downloading a particular song, con-
sumers can mix their favorites and
avoid paying for other songs they
never wanted. Also, consumers
would not have to change and store
CDs, since their entire recording col-
lection could be stored on their com-
puter "jukebox."
60
Evolution of the Copyright Law
of Digital Broadcasting
Prior to the Sound Recording Act
of 1971 ("the 1971 Act"), federal copy-
right law did not prohibit musical
recording piracy. 6 1  As recording
duplication technology emerged in
the late 1960s in the form of afford-
able analog tape recorders, Congress
decided to protect legitimate record
sales by making recording piracy ille-
gal.62 Although the 1971 Act did
authorize copyrights for sound
recordings, it did not create any per-
formance rights for the owners of
sound recordings.
The 1971 Act automatically
expired at the beginning of 1975. In
1976, Congress enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976 ("the 1976
Act"), which contained no automatic
expiration provision. The 1976 Act
provided that all sound recordings, if
original and fixed in a tangible
means of expression, are protected by
a sound copyright. 63 Like its prede-
cessor, the 1976 Act did not create a
performance right for sound record-
ing owners.
Passage of the 1995 Act, like the
1971 Act, was also driven by the
growth of new technology. Congress'
primary concern in the new law was
regulating digital satellite broad-
casts of music by subscription. The
1995 Act departs from the prior acts
because 1) it creates a public per-
formance right for the owners of
sound recordings, and 2) it requires a
compulsory musical license in cer-
tain types of digital music delivery.
The 1995 Act applies only to per-
formances of sound recordings that
are transmitted, digital, and "sound-
only." A transmission, by definition,
must result in "digital phonorecord
delivery," which occurs when the end
user receives an actual digital copy of
the song. A public performance in a
club or concert hall or even playing a
CD or DAT does not constitute a
"transmission" of the music and is
therefore beyond the scope of the
1995 Act. Because the phonorecord
delivery must be digital, analog
broadcasts such as AM/FM radio are
not covered by the Act. Finally, the
1995 Act is limited exclusively to
sound recordings; it does not extend
to music that is part of an audiovisu-
al work such as the soundtrack of a
movie or TV show.
The most interesting provision of
the 1995 Act was the exemption for
non-subscription transmissions of
digital music. This important excep-
tion has since been amended by the
passage of the DMCA.
The 1995 Act is revolutionary
because it creates a new public per-
formance for record companies.
Under the 1995 Act, the law fixes,
rather than deferring to negotiation
the actual rate of royalties paid to
the record companies. 6 4 Since this is
a compulsory license, this amount
determines the prevailing royalty
rates in the industry.
Since the passage of the 1995 Act,
there has been wide debate about the
proper amount of the statutory royal-
ty rate. In July 1998, RIAA and the
three largest cable/satellite digital
music networks attempted but ulti-
mately failed to agree on the rates of
license fees. RIAA maintains that it
should receive a royalty rate of 41.5
percent of a digital music broadcast-
er's gross revenues. This figure was
adopted from the revenue percentage
rate that cable movie networks (such
as HBO or Showtime) pay to movie
companies when they broadcast their
movies on TV. The digital audio sub-
scription services countered with a
royalty rate ranging between 0.5 to
2.0 percent.
As provided by the 1995 Act, a
Copyright Arbitration Panel heard
both sides. The panel determined
that digital audio subscription serv-
ices should pay five percent of their
gross U.S. sales revenue to the record
companies. 65 The record companies
were displeased with this outcome
and appealed unsuccessfully. 6 6
According to the Register of
Copyrights, the record companies
should not be entitled to greater
royalties on the sound recording
than the songwriters receive on the
songs themselves, which would
equal 6.5 percent. 6 7
As made clear by the need for
the DMCA revisions, there were
severe problems with the 1995 Act.
First, the 1995 Act failed to fully
anticipate the development of
streaming digital broadcast technolo-
gy. The narrow contours of the 1995
Act reveal that Congress did not
foresee the advent of this technology.
Related to streaming Internet broad-
casts is the additional problem of
"ephemeral recordings." Ephemeral
recordings are copies of a song,
allowed by law, that a broadcaster
uses to facilitate the broadcast.
When the 1995 Act was enacted,
Congress did not include digital
broadcasts in the ephemeral record-
ing exception.
Second, the 1995 Act failed to
account for the "royalty shift" away
from songwriters and towards record
companies. Digital broadcasting is a
technology that will likely replace
analog broadcasts in the future. If
so, the value of a sound recording
copyright will likely increase relative
to a song copyright since, in digital
broadcasting, the exclusiveness of a
song copyright performance right is
compromised. Thus, as digital
broadcasting becomes more perva-
sive, songwriters may see their
exclusive performance rights dimin-
ished as a result of the 1995 Act.
Third, the 1995 Act failed to
address pressing international issues
and problems. The World
Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), the major international
copyright association, generally sup-
ports the abolition of compulsory
licenses for primary broadcasts and
satellite communications. The 1995
Act deviates form this prevailing view.
Finally, the 1995 Act failed to ade-
quately address enforcement issues.
With the growth of Internet music
distribution, any computer user can
become a digital music broadcaster.
The 1995 Act only targeted sophisti-
cated, for-profit private broadcasters.
Had Congress then recognized that
any computer user could become a
digital broadcaster, it might have
enumerated clearer and broader
penalties for 1995 Act violations.
The DMCA and its Effects on
Digital Broadcasting
In the summer of 1998, Congress
began to address some of the short-
comings of the 1995 Act. The result
of this effort is the newly enacted
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Though the bulk of the DMCA adopts
the 1996 WIPO Performance and
Phonograms Treaty, tucked away in
the DMCA's "Miscellaneous Pro-
visions" are revisions that greatly
modify the 1995 Act.











interested parties in technology reg-
ulation.6 8 At worst, it is the defini-
tive product of special interest legis-
lation. 69  When examining the
DMCA outside the scope of its music
provisions, it is clear that technology
interest groups have directed this
legislation. Title II of the Act limits
the copyright liability of Internet
service providers, while Title III
allows computer repairpersons to use
a customer's copyrighted software.
Remarkably, the end of the Act even
tacks on a provision addressing the
decorative features on the hulls of
ships. According to Ralph Oman, for-
mer Register of Copyrights, the
DMCA has clearly been subject to
the "congressional sausage factory"
of special interests. 70
The music provisions of the DMCA
not only appear to be shaped by spe-
cial interests but also appear to be in
large part actually drafted by
them.7 1 In the late summer of 1998,
while Congress was contemplating
the DMCA, the DiMA and RIAA
engaged in direct talks to arrive at a
compromise of their interests. In the
course of negotiation, these two
interest groups drafted much of the
music provisions of what would
become the law. On August 4, 1998,
Congress incorporated their agree-
ments into the DMCA. 72
Since the DiMA only represents
the three largest Internet broadcast-
ers, it, like RIAA, sought to discour-
age competition from new digital
broadcast companies. The compro-
mise with RIAA produced a narrowly
tailored "grandfather" clause that
extends a government-set royalty
rate only to broadcasters who meet
the exact business profile of the
DiMA members. All future stream-
ing Internet broadcasters must nego-
tiate their rates with the record com-
panies directly, which will likely
result in a higher royalty than the three
members of the DiMA must pay.
7 3
The DMCA changes the 1995 Act
most significantly by eliminating the
sound recording royalty exemption
for most non-interactive, non-sub-
scription digital audio transmissions.
Under the DMCA, non-interactive
audio broadcasts-such as streaming
Internet broadcasts-must, without
question, pay the record companies a
performance royalty rate.
The DMCA, however, creates an
interesting exception of its own. If a
traditional FCC-licensed analog sta-
tion transmits the streaming
Internet broadcast, such a "dual"
broadcaster does not have to pay
record company royalties. The
DMCA then permits existing radio
stations to expand their broadcasts
to the Internet without infringing a
sound recording performance right.
Conversely, an Internet broadcaster
can avoid paying record company
royalties by buying and broadcasting
from an analog radio station.
The DMCA replaces the perva-
sive compulsory license requirement
in the 1995 Act with a more limited
compulsory license. As strong proof
of a successful lobby, the DMCA
allows RIAA to propose its own rates
when negotiating with most future
streaming broadcasters. According
to the DMCA, only "eligible nonsub-
scription transmissions" are subject
to the government-set compulsory
license and can avoid rate negotia-
tion with RIAA. The DMCA defines
an eligible transmission as:
a noninteractive, nonsub-
scription transmission
made as part of a service
that provides audio pro-
gramming consisting... of
performances of sound
recordings.. .if the primary
purpose of the service is
not to sell, advertise, or
promote particular prod-
ucts or services other than
sound recordings, live con-
certs, or other music-relat-
ed events.
7 4
Even once a transmission is found
eligible for the government set royal-
ty rate, a host of additional restric-
tions apply.7 5 The most demanding
of the restrictions requires that a
broadcaster seeking the statutory
royalty rate must have been trans-
mitting on the Web before July 31, 1998.
It is no surprise that the require-
ments for an eligible nonsubscription
mirror the business profiles of the
three members of DiMA. In this
way, the DMCA leaves the record
companies free to negotiate a per-
formance royalty rate closer to its
goal of a 41.5 percent rate.7 6 The
DiMA supported the limited compul-
sory license because the grandfather
provision effectively protects them
from these higher royalties. Their future
competitors will not be as fortunate.
The DMCA also clarifies the sta-
tus of ephemeral recordings used to
facilitate broadcast. The new law
allows their use only by digital
broadcasters that also broadcast in a
traditional format or have a license
from the FCC. For Internet-only
broadcasters, for whom the FCC
requires no license, the DMCA
extends a statutory license for




Passage of the DMCA
Since the passage of the DMCA,
new technology has become available
to attach a digital watermark to
music files that have been down-
loaded from the Internet. 78 This dig-
ital watermark signals when and
whether a royalty has been paid for
the download. Watermarks, howev-
er, do not prevent additional copies of
the music once it is downloaded.
Thus, even a watermarked copy of a
song can be reproduced thousands of
time by the end user. When a song is
copied, however, the watermark
remains, allowing authorities to
trace at least the origin of the first
illegal copy.7 9 In February, RIAA
began the Secure Digital Music
Initiative to encourage legal distribu-
tion of music on the Internet.8 0 At
this time it is unclear what effect this
effort will have on Internet down-
loads of music. As of the time of this
writing, the initiative was scheduled
to hold a conference where the par-
ticipants are expected to advocate
improved watermarking technology.
Secrecy and uncertainty shroud
another Internet music proposal
named "The Madison Project."8 1 In
conjunction with all the major record
labels, IBM is coordinating the devel-
opment of this test-project. IBM
plans on launching a six-month test
of a new music download system in a
thousand San Diego homes this sum-
mer. The Madison System is report-
ed to not use the MP3 encoding stan-
dard. Instead, the system involves a
separate interface that allows a cable
modem user to download songs on a
per use basis. Industry insiders
speculate the Madison Project is per-
fecting a revolutionary piece of hard-
ware that works as an extension of a
cable television box. The new device
will also likely incorporate a video-
on-demand service, another step in
the inevitable integration of enter-
tainment media. Lawmakers cannot
check this relentless transformation;
they can only attempt to respond.
The Sound of the Future
Despite the strength of the 1995
Act and the DMCA, no law can forev-
er preserve the current state of the
record industry. The major record
companies have long enjoyed a near
monopoly in music distribution. In a
large part, they also determine what
is broadcast on the radio. The 1995
Act and the DMCA reveal how the
major record companies, have lob-
bied hard to tame digital music
delivery instead of embracing it.
Despite the prospects of this new dig-
ital age, the major record companies
seem intent on preserving as much of
their fading traditional business
model as possible and creating new
sound recording royalty rights to off-
set whatever losses they sustain.
The digital delivery of music
promises to transform the music
industry from a conglomerate of a
few major companies into a more
accessible and "democratic" business.
The ease and reduced capital costs of
Internet music distribution and
broadcasting present a unique oppor-
tunity for upstart record companies
who embrace its promise. New
Internet record companies, such as
goodnoise.com, liquidaudio.com and
atomicpop.com, have already
bypassed the major record companies
and signed artists directly to record-
ing contracts. Unlike traditional
record companies, these companies
generate popularity for their bands
by giving away their music for free
via the Internet. Ultimately, they
hope to generate a profit by eventu-
ally selling their artists' music exclu-
sively online at reduced rates. The
provisions of the 1995 Act and the
DMCA do not apply to the alterna-
tive structure of these new record
companies; these companies will
directly broadcast and sell their own
music to the public.
Despite the opportunity for
upstart record companies, the 1995
Act and the DMCA still has perva-
sive effects on most digital music dis-
tribution. The major record compa-
nies have built up an extensive cata-
log of songs that they control.
Consumers will not only download
new music but will also want to
download their favorite old songs,
which are inevitably controlled by a
major record company. The major
record companies have no incentive
to allow their songs to be distributed
at less than their already proven
market rate. For these songs, the
record companies will take full
advantage of the 1995 Act and the
DMCA provisions. The major record
companies are also likely to create
their own Internet only record labels.
These labels will probably operate
similarly to the upstart record com-
panies as a test market for new tal-
ent. It will be interesting to see how
established artists deal with their
record companies in the future.
Some successful artists, such as Todd
Rundgrin, who licenses his music
directly to the public on the Internet
might eliminate the need for record
companies altogether. 82
The development of music copy-
right law is intertwined with the
development of new technology. The
1995 Act and the DMCA are clear
legislative responses to the emer-
gence of digital network technology.
These acts illustrate that Congress,
under pressure of powerful recording
lobbies, is willing to radically change
song performance -royalty rights to
protect the interests of large record
companies and established broad-
casters. In the process of protecting
those interests, other parties may be
harmed. The 1995 Act and the
DMCA seem to embody a goal to tie
music distribution to the past
instead of promoting its future.
However, despite the provisions of
the acts, the music industry is, and
promises to continue to be "a
changin"' faster than ever. *
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